ABSTRACT Searchable encryption is a novel cryptographic primitive that enables a data storage server to retrieve the data ciphertexts without the knowledge of either what is searched for or the contents of the searched data ciphertexts. As a useful extension of the public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) invented by Boneh et al., secure channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) eliminates the limitation that the trapdoors of search keywords should be conveyed to the data storage server through secret communication channels. Nevertheless, the current framework of SCF-PEKS is subjected to the security flaw arising from the keyword guessing (KG) attack and thus fails to provide privacy protection for keyword search. In this paper, we put forward an enhanced SCF-PEKS framework called secure channel free public key encryption with privacyconserving keyword search (SCF-PEPCKS). Our framework effectively remedies the security weakness in the SCF-PEKS framework and offers resistance against the existing known KG attacks. We develop a concrete SCF-PEPCKS scheme without using random oracles. The security proofs demonstrate that it offers the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor privacy against both the malicious data storage server and the outside attacker. The comparisons and the experimental results indicate that the presented SCF-PEPCKS scheme is secure and practicable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, increasing attention has been paid to cloud computing because it offers an economical and convenient solution to data management. By migrating local data to the cloud, users can significantly reduce the heavy burden on local data management and get the economical, flexible and convenient services provided by cloud. However, with the popularization of cloud computing, more and more privacy leakage events also make users attach importance to the information security problem. For the data publishers, the third-party cloud service providers are not completely trusted. Therefore, most of them choose to upload the encryption of their data to the data storage servers to ensure the data privacy.
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Traditional data encryption technique hides the contents of the data and thus effectively protects the data confidentiality. But, it also creates new problems. For example, when a user plans to fetch back the data containing certain keywords, the data storage server will face the difficult issue, namely how to search over the data ciphertexts. For the sake of solving the ciphertext retrieval problem, the searchable encryption (SE) technique was invented [1] . By using the new technique, a data user can authorize a third-party data storage server to retrieve his/her data ciphertexts without leaking either what is searched for or the contents of the searched data. SE can be developed over either symmetric encryption or asymmetric encryption. Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes [1] - [9] enjoy the merit of high efficiency, but have the key management and key distribution problems. To overcome the problems in SSE, Boneh et al. [9] put forward the concept of searchable public key encryption (SPKE). SPKE supplies an effective and secure solution to the issue of ciphertext retrieval in the public key encryption systems. A typical SPKE system runs in the following way. On the sender side, to enable the ciphertext C f of a data file f to be searchable, the sender extracts some keywords from the data file f and encrypts these keywords to create a keyword ciphertext C w using the receiver's public key. The keyword ciphertext C w is then attached to the data ciphertext C f to form a searchable ciphertext (C f , C w ). Subsequently, (C f , C w ) is sent and forwarded to the data storage server who stores the data ciphertexts for the receiver. On the receiver side, if the receiver wishes to fetch back the data ciphertexts that contain a specific keyword w from the data storage server, he/she makes use of his/her secret key to create a query trapdoor T w for the search keyword w and then sends it to the data storage server. On receiving search query T w from the receiver, the data storage server checks whether there exist some ciphertexts (C f , C w ) containing the same keyword w. Finally, the data storage server sends the receiver the matching ciphertexts. The SPKE technique has important application value, which can be employed by many practical applications, such as encrypted email system [9] , [10] , cryptographic cloud storage [11] , encrypted audit logs [12] , internet of things [13] , [14] , electronic health/medical system [15] , [16] and etc. Since its invention, SPKE has received extensive attention from the cryptography researchers.
A. RELATED WORKS
In Eurocrypt'04, Boneh et al. [9] put forward the first SPKE framework called public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS). On the basis of the famous identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme contributed by Boneh and Franklin [17] , they designed a PEKS scheme for the encrypted email system. Boneh et al. ' s work created a new line of research. Soon afterwards, many PEKS schemes and variants [18] - [28] were presented. However, the PEKS framework suffers from a weakness, namely that the keyword trapdoors should be conveyed to the data storage server secretly. If not, then the indistinguishability of keyword ciphertexts cannot be guaranteed. Such defect makes PEKS impractical in the application where establishing secure channels is expensive or even impossible. Baek et al. [29] proposed a new SPKE framework named secure channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) to fix this problem. When deploying SCF-PEKS, a data storage server should be employed as the tester whose public key takes part in the generation of keyword ciphertexts. And only the data storage server is able to check if a keyword ciphertext and a trapdoor contains the same keyword using its secret key. In this way, users can send the keyword trapdoors to the data storage server via public secure channels. Following Baek et al. ' s work [29] , a lot of SCF-PEKS schemes were presented [16] , [30] - [36] . Some works [14] , [37] - [45] introduced SPKE into identity-based cryptography/certificateless public key cryptography and presented a lot of identity-based encryption with keyword search (IBEKS)/certificateless public key encryption with keyword search (CLEKS) schemes. Moreover, searchable attribute-based encryption (SABE) was also got extensive attention [46] - [50] , which introduces SPKE into attribute-based encryption to associate the keyword ciphertexts or the keyword trapdoors with sets of user attributes.
In practice applications, users commonly choose keywords from a relatively small keyword set to produce the keyword ciphertexts/trapdoors. This is because users usually search their encrypted data using some well-known keywords as a matter of convenience. Unfortunately, the low-entropy of the search keywords causes the keyword guessing (KG) attack against SPKE. It is possible for a malicious data storage server or an outside attacker to reveal the keyword in given keyword trapdoor/ciphertext by traversing the whole keyword set in an acceptable time. Byun et al. [51] introduced the outside/inside offline KG attack and showed the concrete attacks on the PEKS schemes in [9] , [18] . A subsequent paper by Yau et al. [52] respectively gave the similar attack on the PEKS scheme in [22] and the SCF-PEKS scheme in [29] . Later, Jeong et al. [53] gave a proof that the PEKS framework is vulnerable to the offline KG attack by the malicious data storage server (namely the inside offline KG attack). Rhee et al. [31] presented the concept of keyword trapdoor indistinguishability for the SCF-PEKS framework. Their proof indicates that a SCF-PEKS scheme resists the outside offline KG attack only if it achieves such security property. Yau et al. [54] showed a new KG attack against SCF-PEKS, namely the outside online KG attack. This attack was inspired by the file-injection attack presented by Zhang et al. [55] . Unlike the outside offline KG attack where the attacker makes keyword guessing offline, the outside online KG attack makes use of the search results returned by the data storage server to guess the keyword in online mode. More concretely, the outside attacker first generates the data ciphertexts to contain all possible keywords using the data storage server's and the target receiver's public keys. Then, the attacker injects the ciphertexts into the data storage server and monitors the communications between the data storage server and the target receiver. Once the attacker observes that the search results returned by the server involve one of the previously injected ciphertexts, it learns which keyword is searched by the receiver. Yau et al. ' s work indicates that it is impossible to construct a secure scheme to resist the outside online KG attack under the current PEKS/SCF-PEKS framework. Moreover, Shao and Yang [56] further demonstrated that the SCF-PEKS framework is also vulnerable to the inside offline KG attack, because the data storage server has both abilities to execute the keyword encryption and testing operations.
The KG attack problem may be the most disastrous threat to SPKE, because it causes the leakage of the information related to the data ciphertexts and the search keywords. How to address the KG problem in SPKE has become a challenging and interesting problem. So far, several solutions have been presented in the setting of SCF-PEKS or PEKS. Chen [57] put forward an improved SCF-PEKS framework named secure server-designation PEKS (SPEKS). Unlike the SCF-PEKS framework where the data storage server returns the search results to the receiver directly, SPEKS requires that the data storage server must encrypt the matching data ciphertexts once again using the receiver's public key before returning them. The SPEKS framework clearly provides resistance against the outside online KG attack because the outside attacker cannot derive any useful information about the search keyword from the double-encrypted data ciphertexts. However, it cannot prevent the malicious data storage server from calculating the ciphertexts for the guessed keywords and executing the testing algorithm to confirm its guesses. Hence, SPEKS is still subjected to the inside offline KG attack. In [56] , Shao and Yang proposed another enhanced SCF-PEKS (denoted as SY-SCF-PEKS for convenience) framework. In their framework, the data storage server is required to stop the testing operation if the retrieved ciphertext is not produced by an authentic sender. To achieve this, a trusted certification authority and a signature scheme are introduced into the SCF-PEKS framework. The sender is required to involve an unforgeable signature in any keyword ciphertext. Only if a keyword ciphertext passes the signature verification, the data storage server is allowed to execute the testing operation to check whether the keyword ciphertext contains the search keyword. Based on the SCF-PEKS scheme proposed by Fang et al. [34] , Shao and Yang [56] presented a concrete SY-SCF-PEKS scheme and claimed that it was secure against the inside offline KG attack. It is clear that the SY-SCF-PEKS framework requires that the data storage server operates according to the system specification completely and honestly. This requirement is impractical because the data storage server cannot be entirely trusted in practice. The attack presented in [58] showed that it is possible for a malicious data storage server to bypass the signature verifications for the keyword ciphertexts and launch a successful inside offline KG attack against the SY-SCF-PEKS scheme by partially executing the testing algorithm. Thus, Shao and Yang's solution fails to solve the inside offline KG attack problem.
In the setting of PEKS, Xu et al. [59] introduced an extended PEKS framework called public key encryption with fuzzy keyword search (PEFKS). In the PEFKS framework, a pre-defined fuzzy function, which converts an exact keyword to a fuzzy keyword, is employed to generate the keyword ciphertexts/trapdoors. For each keyword, the sender should respectively produce two different ciphertexts. One is the ciphertext of the exact keyword and the other is the ciphertext of the fuzzy keyword. Both two ciphertexts should be uploaded to the data storage server. On the receiver side, the receiver also produces two different trapdoors, namely the trapdoor of the exact search keyword and the trapdoor of the fuzzy search keyword. But, only the trapdoor of the fuzzy search keyword is sent to the data storage server. At the first glance, PEFKS provides resistance to the inside offline KG attack, since the data storage server has no knowledge of the exact keyword to be searched. However, the fuzzy function should be published public or be included in the receiver's public key. Anyone can use it to produce the fuzzy keyword and then the fuzzy keyword ciphertext for any keyword. Therefore, PEFKS is yet vulnerable to the inside offline KG attack. Chen et al. [60] presented a framework called sever-aided PEKS (SA-PEKS). Unlike the PEKS framework where the keyword ciphertexts/trapdoors are calculated from the original keyword, SA-PEKS imbeds a keyword signature issued by a semi-trusted keyword server in each keyword ciphertext/trapdoor. Specifically, during the production of a keyword ciphertext/trapdoor, a user should first request a deterministic signature of the keyword from the keyword server via a blind signature protocol, and then generate the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor by using both the keyword and the signature. It seems that SA-PEKS withstands the KG attack because the embedded keyword signatures are unforgeable. However, if an attacker is a legitimate user who has access to the keyword server or a data storage server who colludes with the keyword server, the attacker is able to obtain the server's signatures for all possible keywords in advance. Then, the attacker launches the offline KG attack on a SA-PEKS scheme as in the setting of PEKS. Jiang et al. [61] introduced identity-based encryption into PEKS and presented a framework named searchable encrypted keywords against insider attacks (SEKIA). In SEKIA, each user has two different types of key pairs, including an identity-based public/secret key pair and a conventional public/secret key pair. When a user acts as a sender, he/she should use his/her identity-based secret key and the receiver's conventional public key to produce the keyword ciphertexts. On the other hand, namely that a user acts as a receiver, he/she should use his/her conventional secret key and the sender's identity (namely the identity-based public key) to produce the keyword trapdoors. Obviously, the SEKIA framework offers resistance against the inside offline KG attack because the sender's identity-based secret key that is used to generate the keyword ciphertexts is unknown to the data storage server. However, it inevitably has the key escrow problem and the key distribution problem, because every user's identitybased secret key should be created by a trusted private key generator. Sun et al. [62] put forward a hybrid PEKS+SSE framework. In this hybrid framework, the sender uses his/her secret key and the receiver's public key to calculate the keyword ciphertexts. Additionally, the sender creates a trapdoor generation key using his/her secret key and then conveys it to the receiver secretly (as in SSE). On the receiver side, the receiver is able to produce a valid keyword trapdoor to retrieve the received ciphertexts only if both the trapdoor generation key and his/her secret key are used. Obviously, the privacy of the trapdoor generation key prevents an attacker from launching a successful KG attack. However, the PEKS+SSE framework has the key distribution problem because the trapdoor generation keys should be sent securely. Recently, Wu et al. [13] introduced an authorized PEKS (AR-PEKS) framework. In this framework, the sender also uses his/her secret key and the receiver's public key to produce the keyword ciphertexts. To search over the received ciphertexts, the receiver first requests the sender for a token of the search keyword. Then, he/she produces a trapdoor of the search keyword by using the token and his/her secret key. Because no one can make search queries without the sender's authorization, the AR-PEKS framework avoids the KG attack. In addition, it also eliminates the problem of key distribution in the PEKS+SSE framework proposed by Sun et al. [62] , because the keyword token can be sent public. However, the token should be generated via an interactive protocol. Thus, Wu et al.'s framework introduces additional communications between the sender and the receiver.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
How to devise a SCF-PEKS scheme with privacy protection is still an unsolved problem so far, since the SCF-PEKS framework [29] and two enhanced SCF-PEKS frameworks [56] , [57] suffer from the inside offline KG attack. Although the works [13] , [61] , [62] offer some feasible solutions to the problem of inside offline KG attack in SCF-PEKS, they yet have some weaknesses.
In this work, we put forward an enhanced SCF-PEKS scheme supporting privacy conserving keyword search function. The presented scheme resists both the outside online KG attack and inside offline KG attack. Concretely, the main contributions are follows:
1) We propose a new SPKE framework called secure channel free public key encryption with privacy conserving keyword search (SCF-PEPCKS) to remedy the inherent security flaw in the SCF-PEKS framework. Compared with the solutions in [12] , [60] , and [61] , the presented framework enjoys some good properties, such as no key escrow, no secure channel and no receiver-sender interaction. We formalize the security model for the SCF-PEPCKS framework that captures both the keyword ciphertext privacy and the keyword trapdoor privacy against the outside attacker and the malicious data storage server.
2) We construct an efficient SCF-PEPCKS scheme that is proven secure without using the random oracles. Our security proofs demonstrate that the proposed SCF-PEPCKS scheme satisfies: i) the keyword ciphertext privacy against the malicious data storage server and the outside attacker on the complexity assumption of the inverse decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (invDBDH) problem; ii) the keyword trapdoor privacy against the malicious data storage server and the outside attacker on the complexity assumption of the hash Diffie-Hellman (hDH) problem. In addition, we make comparison of the SCF-PEPCKS scheme and some SPEKS schemes in terms of security and performance. The comparison results demonstrate the efficiency of our SCF-PEPCKS scheme and its suitability for deployment in practical applications.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
In the second section, we review some notations and preliminaries briefly. In the third section, we show the security vulnerabilities in the current SCF-PEKS framework. In the forth section, we define the SCF-PEPCKS framework and the corresponding security notions. In the fifth section, we describe our SCF-PEPCKS scheme and then formally prove its security. In the sixth section, we make some comparisons. Eventually, our paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES

A. NOTATIONS
TABLE1 describes the notations used throughout our paper. 
B. BILINEAR MAP AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
Assuming that e is a map from G × G to G T . The map e is called a bilinear pairing if it has the attributes below: 1) Bilinearity:∀µ, ν ∈ Z * q , it has e(P µ , P ν ) = e(P, P) µν ; 2) Non-degeneracy: It satisfies that e(P, P) = 1 G T , where 1 G T denotes the identity element in G T ;
3) Computability:∀µ, ν ∈ Z * q , the value e(P µ , P ν ) can be efficiently calculated.
The SCF-PEPCKS scheme proposed in this paper is proven secure on the complexity assumptions of the invDBDH problem [63] and the hDH problem [64] .
Definition 1:
The invDBDH assumption states that for any polynomialtime (PT) algorithm A invDBDH , it has negligible advantage Adv A invDBDH (ψ) in resolving the invDBDH problem, where
Assuming that f is a hash function mapping from the group G to {0, 1} λ , where λ ∈ Z + . Given f : G → {0, 1} λ and (P, P µ , P ν , h) ∈ G 3 × {0, 1} λ for random numbers µ, ν ∈ Z * q , the hDH problem over the group G is to determine if h = f (P µν ).
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The hDH assumption means that for any PT algorithm A hDH , it has negligible advantage Adv A hDH (ψ) in resolving the hDH problem, where Adv A hDH (ψ) is defined to be |Pr[1
Definition 3:A cryptographic hash function f is collision resistant if for any PT algorithm A CR , it has negligible advantage Adv A CR (ψ) in finding two different inputs µ and ν such that f (µ) = f (ν), where
C. THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF SCF-PEKS
A SCF-PEKS scheme comprises six PT algorithms:
1) SCF-PEKS.GlobalSetup(ψ): Given a system security parameter ψ, the algorithm creates a set of global system parameters gsp that contains the description of a finite keyword space KW.
2) SCF-PEKS.KenGen Server (gsp): Given gsp, the algorithm creates a pair of public key and secret key (PK server , SK server ) for a data storage server.
3) SCF-PEKS.KenGen Receiver (gsp): Given gsp, the algorithm creates a pair of public key and secret key (PK receiver , SK receiver ) for a receiver.
4) SCF-PEKS.KWEncrypt(gsp, PK receiver , PK server , w): Givengsp, PK receiver ,PK server and a keyword w ∈ KW, the algorithm creates a keyword ciphertext C w .
5) SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(gsp, SK receiver , PK server , w ): Given gsp, SK receiver , PK server and a search keyword w ∈ KW, the algorithm creates a keyword trapdoor T w . 6) SCF-PEKS.Test(gsp, SK server , C w , T w ): Given gsp, SK server , C w and T w , the algorithm is executed by a data storage server to verify if C w and T w contain the same keyword (namely that w = w ). The algorithm outputs 1 if w = w or 0 else.
D. TYPES OF KG ATTACKES
There exist two distinct kinds of attackers against the keyword privacy of the SCF-PEKS schemes. They are the inside attacker and the outside attacker. An outside attacker is the malicious entity excluding the receiver and the data storage server. Such attacker can intercept the keyword ciphertexts and the keyword trapdoors by monitoring the communication channel between the data storage server and a target user. But, it cannot confirm its guesses by executing the testing algorithm directly since it does not know the data storage server's secret key. The inside attacker refers to the malicious data storage server. Since it has the ability to execute the testing algorithm, this attacker is able to check if a keyword ciphertext contains the same keyword as a keyword trapdoor. Obviously, the inside attacker is more powerful than the outside attacker.
In the previous works, three different KG attacks were proposed.
1)Outside offline KG attack [51] : This is the KG attack that is performed by the outside attacker. In the outside offline attack, the attacker tries to find the keyword in a keyword trapdoor by traversing the keyword set in the offline mode. As introduced by Baek et al. [29] , the keyword trapdoors in PEKS should be sent secretly. If not, these trapdoors are inevitability vulnerable to this attack. The reason is that in a PEKS system anyone can generate the keyword ciphertexts for his/her guesses and then run the testing algorithm to validate the correctness of his/her guesses. In addition, the design fault in the form of keyword trapdoor also causes this attack, even though the attacker cannot execute the testing algorithm. For example, as shown by Yau et al. [52] , the SCF-PEKS scheme presented by Baek et al. [29] suffers from such weakness. Rhee et al. [31] drew a conclusion that a SCF-PEKS scheme can provide immunity against the outside offline KG attack only if the trapdoors are indistinguishable for the outside attacker.
2) Outside online KG attack [54] : This is the KG attack that is performed by the outside attacker in the online mode. In the outside online KG attack, the attacker first prepares the set of all probable keywords and creates the searchable data ciphertexts containing these keywords. Then, the attacker injects the data ciphertexts into the data storage server. Subsequently, the attacker monitors the communications between the data storage server and the target receiver. Once observing that the returned search results involve one of the previously injected ciphertexts, it learns what is searched for by the target receiver. Such KG attack is viable because it merely needs to monitor the communications between the data storage server and the target receiver without breaking either party. As demonstrated by Yau et al. [54] , it's an impossibility to construct a secure SCF-PEKS scheme against the outside online KG attack by exploiting the current SCF-PEKS framework.
(3) Inside offline KG attack [51] : This is the KG attack that is performed by the malicious data storage server. In the inside offline attack, the malicious data storage server tries to find the keyword in a keyword trapdoor by traversing the keyword set in the offline mode. This attack is similar with the outside offline attack. But, since the data storage server stores all data ciphertexts of the target user, it is able to further find which data ciphertexts contain the same keyword after successfully compromising the keyword in the target user's keyword trapdoor. The works [53] and [56] respectively confirmed that the PEKS framework and the SCF-PEKS framework suffer from the problem of inside offline KG attack.
III. SECURITY WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT SCF-PEKS FRAMWORK
In this section, we describe how an attacker launches an outside online KG attack or an inside offline KG attack on a SCF-PEKS scheme to show the weakness in the current SCF-PEKS framework.
A. OUTSIDE ONLINE KG ATTACK ON SCF-PEKS
An outside attacker executes an outside online KG attack on a SCF-PEKS scheme in the following way:
1) The outside attacker selects a target receiver.
2) The outside attacker prepares a keyword set {w 1 , w 2 ,. . . ,w n } ⊆ KW that involves all probable keywords and then creates the data ciphertexts C data 1 , C data 2 ,. . . ,C data n corresponding to these keywords respectively. All these data ciphertexts are created by using the target receiver's public key PK receiver . In addition, the keywords w 1 , w 2 ,. . . ,w n are respectively encrypted by the data storage server's public key PK server and the target receiver's public key PK receiver to produce the corresponding keyword ciphertexts C w 1 , C w 2 ,. . . , C w n , where C w i = SCF-PEKS.KWEncrypt(gsp, PK receiver , PK server , w i ) for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Finally, the outside attacker injects the searchable data ciphertexts (C data 1 , C w 1 ), (C data 2 , C w 2 ),. . . , (C data n , C w n ) into the data storage server. We assume that the outside attacker keeps a list {< w i , C data i >} to record the relation between a keyword and a data ciphertext.
3) Upon receiving a search query T w from the target receiver, the data storage server seeks out all matching data ciphertexts and then sends back the search results. Note that, because of the secure-channel-free property of the SCF-PEKS framework, the outside attacker is able to intercept the trapdoor T w .
4) The outside attacker listens in on the communication channel between the target receiver and the data storage server. Once observing that the returned results contain one data ciphertext sent by it previously (e.g.,C data i ), it checks the list {< w i , C data i >} and determines that the keyword involved in T w is w i without doubt, which indicates a right guess.
B. INSIDE OFFLINE KG ATTACK ON SCF-PEKS
In the above online KG attack, because the outside attacker does not know the data storage server's secret key, it cannot use the testing algorithm to verity its guesses directly. However, it can easily inject the ciphertexts of the guessed keywords into the data storage server and obtain the testing results by monitoring the communications between the data storage server and the target receiver. This security flaw can be overcome if the keyword trapdoors are conveyed secretly or the returned data ciphertexts are encrypted again by using the target receiver's public key. However, the improved framework is still subjected to the problem of inside offline KG attack.
A data storage server executes an inside offline KG attack on a SCF-PEKS scheme as below:
1) The data storage server first chooses a target receiver. It then receives a keyword trapdoor T w from the receiver.
2) The data storage server surmises a keyword w ∈ KW. By using the target receiver's public key PK receiver and its own public key PK server , it executes the keyword encryption algorithm SCF-PEKS.KWEncrypt(gsp, PK receiver , PK server , w ) to calculate the ciphertext C w of the keyword w .
3) Using its own secret key SK server , the data storage server runs the testing algorithm SCF-PEKS.Test(gsp, SK server , C w , T w ) to check whether C w and T w contain the same keyword. If it does, then the keyword w is a right surmise. Else, the data storage server returns to 2) and goes on with its guessing.
IV. FORMAL MODEL OF SCF-PEPCKS A. FRAMEWORK DEFINITION
As shown by the KG attacks in the previous section, the reason that the current SCF-PEKS framework cannot fend against the outside online KG attack and the inside offline KG attack is that the keyword ciphertexts are produced from the keyword directly by using the data storage server and the receiver's public keys. As a result, an outside attacker or a data storage server can surmise all potential keywords, create the correlative data ciphertexts and then take the data storage server as a test oracle by performing file-injection (in case of outside online KG attack) or execute the testing algorithm (in case of inside offline KG attack) to verify its guesses.
To provide privacy-conserving keyword search function, our SCF-PEPCKS framework enhances the current SCF-PEKS framework by preventing the attackers from producing the keyword ciphertexts to verify their guesses. To do so, it implants the sender's secret key into the computation of the keyword ciphertexts. Specifically, besides the data storage server and the receiver's public keys, our SCF-PEPCKS framework additionally requires the sender's secret key to calculate the keyword ciphertexts. Because the secret key is known only by the sender, the keyword ciphertexts cannot be produced by anyone except the sender. If the keyword trapdoors also achieve the indistinguishable security against the data storage server and the outside attacker, then the scheme under our SCF-PEPCKS framework must obtain immunity to both the inside offline KG attack and the outside online KG attack. As illustrated in FIGURE 1, four entities are involved in our SCF-PEPCKS framework, including a system parameter VOLUME 7, 2019 generation center (SPGC), a sender, a receiver and a data storage server. The SPGC is employed in generating the global system parameters. The sender produces and outsources the searchable data ciphertexts to the data storage server. The receiver can search over his/her data ciphertexts on the data storage server. To perform the retrieval task, he/she sends a trapdoor of the search keyword to the data storage server. Using the trapdoor, the data storage server can seek out all matching data ciphertexts and then return the search results to the receiver.
Formally, a SCF-PEPCKS scheme consists of seven PT algorithms:
1) GlobalSetup(ψ): Given a security parameter ψ, a SPGC executes the algorithm to create a list of global system parameters gsp that contains the description of a finite keyword space KW.
2) KenGen Server (gsp): Given gsp, a data storage server executes the algorithm to create a pair of public and secret keys (PK server , SK server ).
3) KenGen Sender (gsp): Given gsp, a sender executes the algorithm to create a pair of public and secret keys (PK sender , SK sender ).
4) KenGen Receiver (gsp): Given gsp, a receiver executes the algorithm to create a pair of public and secret keys (PK receiver , SK receiver ).
5) KWEncrypt(gsp, SK sender , PK receiver , PK server , w): Given gsp, SK sender , PK receiver ,PK server and a keyword w ∈ KW, a sender executes the algorithm to create a keyword ciphertext C w . 6) Trapdoor(gsp, SK receiver , PK sender , PK server , w ): Given gsp, SK receiver , PK sender , PK server and a search keyword w ∈ KW, a receiver executes the algorithm to create a keyword trapdoor T w . 7) Test(gsp, SK server , C w , T w ): Givengsp, SK server , C w and T w , a data storage server executes the algorithm to verify if C w and T w contain the same keyword (namely that w = w ). The algorithm outputs 1 if w = w or 0 otherwise.
For consistency, it is required that ∀w ∈ KW, we have that 1 ← Test(gsp, SK server , C w , T w ), if C w ← KWEncrypt(gsp, SK sender , PK receiver , PK server , w) and T w ← Trapdoor(gsp, SK receiver , PK sender , PK server , w), where gsp, (PK server , SK server ), (PK sender , SK sender ) and (PK receiver , SK receiver ) are generated respectively in accordance with the specifications of the algorithms GlobalSetup, KenGen Server , KenGen Sender and KenGen Receiver .
B. SECURITY DEFINITIONS
To fend against the existing known KG attacks, a SCF-PEPCKS scheme must achieve the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor privacy against both the malicious data storage server and the outside attacker. The keyword ciphertext privacy requires that neither the malicious data storage server nor the outside attacker can obtain any information about the keywords from the keyword ciphertexts, while the keyword trapdoor privacy requires that neither the malicious data storage server nor the outside attacker can obtain any information about the keywords from the keyword trapdoors.
We define two indistinguishable games to formalize the security of SCF-PEPCKS, including the keyword ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptively chosen keyword attack (denoted as KC-IND-CKA for convenience) game and the keyword trapdoor indistinguishability against the adaptively chosen keyword attack (denoted as KT-IND-CKA for convenience) game.
The KC-IND-CKA game shows that an adversary (denoted by A KC ) is unable to differentiate the ciphertexts of two distinct keywords on which it wants to be challenged. It is played between a game challenger and the adversary A KC as follows:
Game Setup Phase. The challenger simulates the algorithms GlobalSetup, KenGen Server , KenGen Sender and KenGen Receiver to produce gsp, (PK server , SK server ), (PK sender , SK sender ) and (PK receiver , SK receiver ), respectively. It then supplies the adversary A KC with {gsp, PK server , PK sender , PK receiver } if it is an outside attacker or {gsp, PK server , SK server , PK sender , PK receiver } if it is a malicious data storage server.
Query-Answer Phase 1. In this query-answer phase, the adversary A KC is allowed to send queries to the following three oracles adaptively. These oracles are controlled by the challenger.
-O Encryption : Given a keyword w ∈ KW, the challenger responds with C w ← KWEncrypt(gsp, SK sender , PK receiver , PK server , w).
-O Trapdoor : Given a keyword w ∈ KW, the challenger responds with T w ← Trapdoor(gsp, SK receiver , PK sender , PK server , w).
-O Testing : Given C w and T w , the challenger responds with the result of the testing algorithm Test(gsp, SK server , C w , T w ). This oracle is merely queried by the outside attacker. It simulates the outside attacker's ability to utilize the testing result of the data storage server to verify if a keyword ciphertext matches a keyword trapdoor.
Challenge Phase. The adversary A KC submits two different keywords (w 0 , w 1 ), but with the restriction that it has never queried the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor of either w 0 or w 1 . Once receiving the adversary A KC 's challenge request, the challenger randomly selects a bit β ∈ {0, 1}, calculates a challenge keyword ciphertext C w β by executing the keyword encryption algorithm KWEncrypt(gsp, SK sender , PK receiver , PK server , w β ), and then returns C w β to A KC .
Query-Answer Phase 2. In this query-answer phase, the adversary A KC continues to ask various oracle queries, but with the restrictions that A KC is disallowed to query the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor of either w 0 or w 1 .
Guess Phase. The adversary A KC submits its guess β ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger. If β = β , it wins the game.
We Next, we describe the KT-IND-CKA game which shows that an adversary (denoted by A KT ) is unable to differentiate the trapdoors of two distinct keywords on which it wants to be challenged. It is played between a game challenger and the adversary A KT as follows:
Game Setup Phase. The challenger initializes the game in the same way as it does in the KC-IND-CKA game.
Query-Answer Phase 1. In this query-answer phase, the adversary A KT is allowed to send queries to the oracles O Encryption , O Trapdoor and O Testing adaptively. The challenger answers these queries in the same way as it does in KC-IND-CKA-Game.
Challenge Phase. The adversary A KT submits two different keywords w 0 and w 1 , but with the restriction that it has never queried the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor of either w 0 or w 1 . Once receiving the adversary A KT 's challenge request, the challenger selects β ∈ {0, 1} randomly, calculates a challenge keyword trapdoor T w β by running the trapdoor generation algorithm Trapdoor(gsp, SK receiver , PK sender , PK server , w β ), and then returns T w β to the adversary A KT .
Query-Answer Phase 2. In this query-answer phase, the adversary A KT continues to ask various oracle queries, but with the restrictions that A KT cannot query the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor of either w 0 or w 1 .
Guess Phase. In the end, the adversary A KT submits its guess β ∈ {0, 1} to the challenger. If β = β , it wins the game.
We 
V. A CONCRETE SCF-PEPCKS SCHEME
Next, we describe the proposed SCF-PEPCKS scheme and then formally prove its security in the standard model. In addition, we make comparison of our SCF-PEPCKS scheme and some existing SPEKS schemes in terms of security properties and performance.
A. BASIC IDEA OF OUR CONSTRUCTION
In order to implant the sender's secret key into the keyword ciphertexts, our SCF-PEPCKS scheme binds the keyword with a sender-receiver shared secret to produce the keyword ciphertexts/trapdoors. Concretely, given a keyword w ∈ KW, the keyword encryption algorithm of our scheme first utilizes the sender's secret key and the receiver's public key to produce a shared secret ρ. Then, it makes use of the data storage server and the receiver's public keys to encrypt the conjunction of w and ρ(i.e., w||ρ) to create a ciphertext C w for the keyword w. Similarly, on the receiver side, given a search keyword w ∈ KW, the trapdoor generation algorithm of our scheme first utilizes the receiver's secret key and the sender's public key to produce the same secret ρ. Then, it makes use of the receiver's secret key to sign on the conjunction of w and ρ(i.e., w ||ρ) to produce a trapdoor T w for the search keyword w . It is clear that C w and T w must be a right match if w = w . Because the data storage server and the outside attacker do not know the secret ρ, neither of them is able to launch the online/offline KG attacks by generating the keyword ciphertexts of its guesses.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE SCHEME
Our SCF-PEPCKS scheme consists of the following algorithms:
1) GlobalSetup(ψ): Given ψ, this algorithm generates two q-order multiplicative cyclic groups (G, G T ) and a bilinear pairing e: G × G → G T . It picks a generator P ∈ G and another two elements Q 1 , Q 2 ∈ G randomly. In addition, it selects three collision-resistant hash functions 2) KenGen Server (gsp): On input gsp, this algorithm picks a number s ∈ Z * q randomly and calculates S = P s . Then, it returns the data storage server's secret key SK server = s and public key PK server = S.
3) KenGen Sender (gsp): On input gsp, this algorithm picks a number x ∈ Z * q randomly and calculates X = P x . Then, it returns the sender's secret key SK sender = x and public key PK sender = X . 4) KenGen Receiver (gsp): On input gsp, this algorithm picks two numbers y, z ∈ Z * q randomly and calculates Y = P y and Z = P 1/z . Then, it returns the receiver's secret key SK receiver = (y, z) and public key PK receiver = (Y , Z ). 5) KWEncrypt(gsp, SK sender , PK receiver , PK server , w): On input gsp, SK sender = x, PK receiver = (Y , Z ), PK server = S and w ∈ KW, this algorithm randomly selects r ∈ Z * q , computes U = Z r and V = H 3 (e(S,
) r ), where ρ = H 1 (Y x ). Then, it returns the keyword ciphertext C w = (U , V ). Here, we clearly have e(S, Q 1 · Q H 2 (w||ρ) 2 ) = e(S, Q 1 )·e(S, Q 2 ) H 2 (w||ρ) . Therefore, the pairing computation can be reduced if e(S, Q 1 ) and e(S, Q 2 ) are pre-computed and thus the algorithm only calculates two exponentiations in G and two exponentiations in G T to encrypt a keyword.
6) Trapdoor(gsp, SK receiver , PK sender , PK server , w ): On input gsp, SK receiver = (y, z), PK sender = X , PK server = S and w ∈ KW, this algorithm computes
) z , where ρ = H 1 (X y ). Then, it returns the keyword trapdoor T w . 7) Test(gsp, SK server , C w , T w ): On input gsp, SK server = s, C w = (U , V ) and T w , this algorithm checks whether the equation H 3 (e(U , T w ) s ) = V holds. If it does, output 1; else, output 0. VOLUME 7, 2019 According to the specification of the above algorithms, we have
Because ρ = ρ, we have that the equation H 3 (e(U , T w ) s ) = V holds if w = w . Therefore, the proposed scheme is correct.
C. SECURITY PROOFS
Next, we analyze the security of our SCF-PEPCKS scheme by employing the game-hopping proof method [65] . The following difference lemma [65] is used by our security proofs.
Lemma
The following are our security statements and the proofs. 
Proof: The theorem can be proven by a game sequence that is composed of five games. We denote them by Game 0 , Game 1 ,. . . , Game 4 respectively. In each game, the adversary A KC gives its guess β for β eventually. For simplicity, we denote the event that A KC 's guess in Game i is correct (i.e.,β = β) by Correct i and A KC 's advantage in Game i by Adv i respectively. Therefore,
These five games hop in the following way. Game 0 : This game is the original KC-IND-CKA game played by A KC . In the setup phase of the game, the challenger runs the algorithms GlobalSetup, KenGen Server , KenGen Sender and KenGen Receiver to produce gsp, (PK server , SK server ), (PK sender , SK sender ) and (PK receiver , SK receiver ), respectively. It then supplies the adversary A KC with {gsp, PK server , PK sender , PK receiver } if it is an outside attacker or {gsp, PK server , SK server , PK sender , PK receiver } if it is a malicious data storage server. During two query-answer phases, the adversary A KC is allowed to send some queries to the oracles {O Encryption , O Trapdoor , O Testing } adaptively and the challenger responds as defined in the KC-IND-CKA game. Finally, the adversary A KC issues a challenge on two different keywords (w 0 , w 1 ) and then determines which one of the keywords w 0 and w 1 is involved in the challenge ciphertext C w β returned by the challenger. In this game, we clearly have 
Game 2 : This game is played as same as Game 1 except that some parameters are modified. At the setup phase of the game, the challenger randomly selects a, b, s, u, v, x 
, Y = P y and Z = (P a ) 1/z , sets SK server = s, PK server = S, PK sender = X and PK receiver = (Y , Z ). Other parameters are produced as same as in Game 1 . Obviously, the new parameters are distributed identically to the ones in Game 1 . Hence, we get Adv 1 = Adv 2 .
Game 3 : This game is played as same as Game 2 except that the ways that the challenger answers the oracles {O Encryption , O Trapdoor , O Testing } and generates the challenge keyword ciphertext are changed.
During two query-answer phases, the challenger answers the adversary A KC 's queries as follows:
O Encryption : Given a keyword w ∈ KW, the challenger selects r ∈ Z * q randomly and calculates a keyword ciphertext
) r )), where ρ = H 1 (Y x ). Then, it outputs C w to the adversary A KC .
O Trapdoor : Given a keyword w ∈ KW, the challenger computes a keyword trapdoor T w = (Q 1 · Q H 2 (w||ρ) 2 ) z , where ρ = H 1 (X y ). Then, it returns T w to the adversary A KC .
O Testing : Given a ciphertext C w = (U , V ) and a trapdoor T w , the challenger outputs 1 if H 3 (e(U , T w ) s ) = V or 0 otherwise.
According to the above simulation of the oracles O Encryption and O Trapdoor , we have
In the challenge phase, once the adversary A KC issues its challenge by submitting two different keywords (w 0 , w 1 ), the challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1}, selects a number r * ∈ Z * q randomly and computes the challenge keyword ciphertext as
where ρ = H 1 (Y x ). Then, it returns C w β to the adversary A KC . If let r = r * /a, then we have
Therefore, the challenge keyword ciphertext C w β has the correct form.
Obviously, Game 3 and Game 2 are indistinguishable to the adversary A KC , since the challenger simulates all oracles perfectly and produces the challenge keyword ciphertext correctly as in Game 2 . Therefore, Adv 2 = Adv 3 .
Game 4 : This game is played as same as Game 3 except that the challenger ignores the values of a, b and merely keeps P a and P b . The challenge keyword ciphertext C w β = (U * , V * ) is produced as in Game 3 but using a random group element R ∈ G T to calculate V * = H 3 (R (u+v·H 2 (w β ||ρ))·s·r * ). Clearly, Game 4 
Because the hash function H 2 has the collision resistance and the invDBDH assumption holds in (G, G T ), both Adv A CR (ψ) and Adv A invDBDH (ψ) are negligible. Since 
Game 2 : This game is played as same as Game 1 except that some parameters are modified. At the setup phase of the game, the challenger randomly selects a, b, s, u, v, z ∈ Z * q , computes Q 1 = P u , Q 2 = P v , S = P s , X = P a , Y = P b and Z = P 1/z , sets SK server = s, PK server = S, PK sender = X and PK receiver = (Y , Z ). Other parameters are produced as same as in Game 1 . Obviously, the new parameters are distributed identically to the ones in Game 1 . Hence, we get Adv 1 = Adv 2 .
Game 3 : This game is played as same as Game 2 except that the challenger ignores the values of a, b and merely keeps a tuple (P a , P b , h), where h is chosen from {0, 1} λ randomly. The challenger answers the oracles {O Encryption , O Trapdoor , O Testing } and produces the challenge keyword trapdoor in the following way.
During two query-answer phases, the challenger answers the adversary A KT 's queries as follows:
O Encryption : Given a keyword w ∈ KW, the challenger selects a number r ∈ Z * q randomly and calculates a keyword
) r )), where ρ = h. Then, it outputs C w to the adversary A KT . Clearly, if h = H 1 (P ab ), then C w is a correct keyword ciphertext of w.
O Trapdoor : Given a keyword w ∈ KW, the challenger computes a keyword trapdoor
) z , where ρ = h. Then, it returns T w to the adversary A KT . Clearly, if h = H 1 (P ab ), then T w is a correct keyword trapdoor of w.
O Testing : Given a ciphertext C w = (U , V ) and a trapdoor T w , the challenger outputs 1 if H 3 (e(U , T w ) s ) = V or 0 otherwise. VOLUME 7, 2019 TABLE 2. Security properties of our scf-pepcks framework and the previous spke frameworks.
In the challenge phase, once the adversary A KT issues its challenge by submitting two different keywords (w 0 , w 1 ), the challenger flips a random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and calculates
) z , where ρ = h. It then outputs T w β to the adversary A KT as the challenge keyword trapdoor. Obviously, if h = H 1 (P ab ), then T w β is a correct trapdoor of w β .
It is clear that 
Because the hash function H 2 has the collision resistance and the hDH assumption holds in G, both Adv A CR (ψ) and
This accomplishes the proof of Theorem 2.
VI. COMPARISONS
We first compare the security properties of our SCF-PEPCKS framework with the previous SPKE frameworks, including PEKS [9] , SEK-IA [61] , PEKS+SSE [62] , AR-PEKS [13] , SCF-PEKS [29] , SPEKS [57] and SY-SCF-PEKS [56] ). The details are shown in TABLE 2. The comparison indicates that our SCF-PEPCKS framework enjoys some good properties (including no key escrow and distribution, no secure channel and no sender-receiver interaction) while providing resistance against the outside online KG attack and the inside offline KG attack. Next, we assess the efficiency of the presented SCF-PEPCKS scheme. We compare it with the SCF-PEKS schemes [16] , [29] , [31] , [34] , [35] in terms of the computational efficiency and the communicational efficiency. TABLE 3 gives the performance of the compared schemes, where τ p , τ e , τ et , τ mtp , τ s and τ v stand for the running time for computing a pairing, an exponentiation in the group G, an exponentiation in the group G T , a map-to-point hash, a one-time signature (OTS) and a OTS verification, respectively; |G |, |G T | and |Z * q | stand for the size of one element in G, G T and Z * q , respectively; |vk|, |σ | and λ denote the size of a signature verification key, a signature and a hash value, respectively. We evaluate the computational efficiency of an algorithm by adding the time of the basic operations. Here, the time costs of some efficient operations such as the general cryptographic hash are ignored. As an example, our SCF-PEPCKS scheme needs to calculate two exponentiations in G and two exponentiations in G T to encrypt a keyword. Hence, the time cost of keyword encryption is 2t e + 2 t et . In the communicational efficiency comparison, the keyword ciphertext/trapdoor size is measured by the sizes of involved elements and values. For instance, the ciphertext of a keyword in our SCF-PEPCKS scheme contains a group element in G and a hash value. Thus, the keyword ciphertext size is (|G| + λ) bits.
We estimate the running time and communication overhead of the schemes in TABLE 3 by employing the PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography) library [66] on a Lenovo L440 Laptop that runs Windows 7 (64bit) with Intel(R) Core TM i7 CPU@2.3GHz and 8GB RAM memory. We instantiate the bilinear map using the Type A pairing over the elliptic curve E(F p ): y 2 = x 3 + x with 2 embedding degree and 512-bit group size. In addition, the OTS scheme in [34] and the general cryptographic hash function are respectively instantiated by Bellare and Shoup's OTS scheme [67] and SHA-256. The experimental results are shown by FIGURE 2 -FIGURE 5. As illustrated in FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3, our SCF-PEPCKS scheme outperforms the SCF-PEKS schemes [16] , [29] , [31] , [34] , [35] in both keyword encryption and testing. Specifically, the time of encryption for a single keyword in our scheme is about 6.322ms, while that in the schemes [16] , [29] , [31] , [34] , [35] is about 17.485ms, 12.693ms, 15.046ms, 33.338ms and 14.189ms, respectively. In addition, it costs about 3.701ms to test if a keyword ciphertext matches a trapdoor in our scheme, while that in the schemes [16] , [29] , [31] , [34] , [35] is about 27.151ms, 8.809ms, 15.046ms, 25.018ms and 9.214ms, respectively. For the communication cost, a keyword ciphertext in our scheme has 0.75kb, while a keyword trapdoor has 0.5kb.
As shown by FIGURE 4 and FIGURE 5, the communicational performance of our scheme is as efficient as that of the scheme in [29] and is better than that of the schemes in [16] , [31] , [34] , and [35] .
According to the experimental results, we can conclude that our SCF-PEPCKS scheme enjoys the best performance in comparison with the SCF-PEKS schemes [16] , [29] , [31] , [34] , [35] .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a new SPKE framework named SCF-PEPCKS to fix the security flaw in SCF-PEKS. The presented SCF-PEPCKS framework has some good properties, such as no key escrow and distribution, no secure channel and no sender-receiver interaction. Under the framework, we construct an efficient SCF-PEPCKS scheme and give formal security proofs in the standard model. The proofs demonstrate that our scheme achieves the keyword ciphertext privacy and the keyword trapdoor privacy against both the outside online KG attack and the inside offline KG attack. Experimental results and comparisons show that it is practicable. 
